Military Interventions Are Failing To Counter Extremist Insurgency

Military interventions have manifestly failed, time and time again, to be effective as regards counter insurgency. These interventions are adopted under the guise of some multilateral arrangements or with the disguised blessing or direct of the UNSC.

For context purposes, let’s start the discussion with the AU peacekeeping mission in Somalia, held under the blessings of an entire UNSC resolutions, Res 2472 that authorized AU member states to use military force to intervene and counter the Al Shebaab insurgency in 2007.

This military centric approach was to last, ostensibly for six months but has been renewed time and time again whilst the level of violence in Somalia and troop contributing countries has only but increased.

The recent Global Terrorism Index (2020) shows that Somalia is beset by instances of terrorism whilst numerous forays by Al Shebaab into Kenya (Westgate Shopping Mall and Garisa University Asymmetric terror attacks) proves that retributive violent incursions into troop contributing countries is a menace that can be seen to be a direct by-product of military centric approaches to regional crisis.

The events in the Niger Delta where France, probably per the doctrine of R2P has been militarily entangled highlights that this one size fits all approach to COIN is not effective as it is parroted to be

The Comminique released by SADC in Botswana also sought to address issues of troop contribution to Mozambique.

Therein lies the challenge. The triumvirate trio of Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola, under the auspices of regional integration and national sovereignty intervened, militarily, in the DRC (Operation Sovereign Legitimacy) in 1998.

The intervention was directly responsible for the collapse of the Zimbabwean economy (Black Friday Market Crash), descent into anarchy and chaos of the hybrid post-colonial state, escalation of violence in the Great Lakes region and a rise in fragile states within the greater equator zone.

The proliferated increase in arms of war resulted in the emergence of warlord (e.g. Bosco Ndagana, Wamba dia Wamba) and subsequent assassination of LD Kabila.

The SADC led intervention did not manage to bring peace and stability into the war ravaged country yet 18 years after Zimbabwe pulled out of the Congo at the behest of SADC, the country is part of an agenda and international conspiracy to intervene again. No lessons learnt.

Any involvement of foreign troops in a COIN initiative is guaranteed to be a cataclysmic failure. The rapture and related chaos to follow gives traction to this analogy.

Hyper nationalism is clear. People generally despise foreign military presence.

The Sunni Insurgency of 2003-2013 in Iraq gave us good lessons. Despite being told and made to believe that foreign troops under the guise of the Bush Doctrine are going to be seeking to restore democracy which was alleged to have been masterbated upon by Saddam Hussein, the people of Iraq said no to foreign occupation, rose up, took up arms and the resultant anarchy led to the emergency of Abu Musab Al Zarqawi, founder of modern day IS.

The by-product of military intervention is clear:

1. More gangs
2. More anarchy
3. Less stability
4. More chaos
5. More deaths
6. Regional escalation

I will not even mention Libya and that NATO led intervention.

For context, the insurgency in Cabo Delgado is clearly LOCALIZED with the direct risk of escalating into a Boko Haram kind of scenario once foreign troops are involved.

Definitely Mozambique needs help but that help must be in the form of capacity building and enhancement programs aimed at ensuring that the country has got institutions and systems capable of muting in the bud the escalating violence.

There are many ways of engaging in COIN. Clearly, there is a need to mix COIN approaches by the Mozambicans themselves, the thrust being to put more emphasis on civilian centric approaches and gelling it with law enforcement thrust.

Cost of cooperation must be made high meaning that decapitation measures of attrition ought to be successfully implemented whilst respecting human rights. This has been done before.

We saw this in Sri Lanka. The 26 year old Tamil Insurgency wad muted by a home grown COIN thrust as directed by the Rajakpaksa Model.

No foreign troops were involved. The death of Prabakaran signaled the end of the insurgency. This is what SADC ought to appreciate.

Reprisal attacks in many of these porous bordered SADC states will make economies collapse. Imagine the negative ramifications say to tourism of one tourist resort center is attacked.

A more pragmatic way of doing it outside of the usage of guns and tanks is the institutional/law enforcement thrust

Definitely, the SADC Communique represents a dedicated belief in the efficacy of multilateralism to resolve domestic challenges but that again, has got its limits.

To understand these limits and thence predict prognosis, the Asymmetric Warfare Equation shall be used:-

The asymmetric warfare equation is thus

AW=Asymmetric Threat (AT) + Asymmetric Operations (AO) + Cultural Asymmetry (CA) + Asymmetric Cost (AC)

Simplified

AW= AT +AO + CA+AC

Are there any asymmetric operations currently underway in Moz? Yes!

1. Diplomacy (EU etc.)
2. Military (Wagner Group, Dyke et al)
3. Economic sabotage (e.g. takeover of Mocimba de Pria port)

The last two aspects of the equation paint a gory picture as to cost of intervention.

Definitely, IPB (intelligence preparation of battlefield) already is making it clear that military centric COIN even per countries with strong defense budgets, shall be extreme.

Use Afghanistan and Boko Haram for there is definite similarities. As regards that, Zimbabwe does not have capacity, e.g. it needed SA engineers to help us rehabilitate broken infrastructure brought about by the asymmetric event, Idai.

What are the cultural issues per cultural asymmetry in the restive region of Cabo Delgado, Mozambique?

1. Values (Islamic)
2. Norms
3. Rules
4. Target population (demographics and structural issues indicate sympathy to the insurgency cause)

Thrust;

Is there an asymmetric threat in Mozambique? Yes

What form/kind?

1. Terrorism
2. Insurgency
3. Information warfare
4. Disruptive threats (Idai)
5. Unknown threats e.g. Climate Change induced

We are alien to Islamic values. It will quickly escalate into a religious conflict. Check Armenia vs Azerbaijan and related alliances that are emerging.

What are the likely costs to be incurred by any intervention (AC)

1. Cost of action (Indonesian incursion into East Timor costed an equivalent of 50% of its GDP. Forced to quit. Same as the Rhodesians and also operation sovereign legitimacy by Zim in DRC)
2. Cost of defense

Prognosis of intervention:

POOR

Our border with Mozambique (+/-1000) is too long and porous for guerilla warfare to be defeated.

Our capacity ravaged due to sanctions and amplified vices such as corruption. Per doctrine we are ok but anything post that dololo (nothing).